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ARTICLES
Reading the Clean Air Act After Brown & Williamson
by Michael Herz 1

I. Introduction
Smoking is not considered an environmental issue. Congress has kept the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) out of the tobacco regulation game by excluding tobacco from coverage under the statute otherwise most appropriate for that use, the Toxic Substances Control Act, 2
and EPA's halting steps toward regulation of secondhand
smoke have hit a judicial roadblock. 3 Nonetheless, tobacco
lurks on the fringes of environmental law and policy-not
least because, as the single most significant threat to public
health, it provides a benchmark against which environmental risks are often measured (usually by those arguing
against regulating those risks). Now federal tobacco regulation has led to a judicial decision of potentially great significance for environmental lawyers: Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 4 Though not an
"environmental case" as such, Brown & Williamson holds
important lessons for environmental law and litigation.
After a brief description of the opinions in the case, I
will comment on two aspects of the decision of particular
importance to environmental lawyers: the Court's handling
of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 5 and its reliance on post-enactment developments in interpreting a statute.

Il. The Court's Decision in Brown & Williamson
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) 6 authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regu-

late "drugs" and "devices. " 7 Throughout almost its entire
history, the FDA took the position that tobacco cigarettes
were neither a drug nor a device and that it lacked authority
to regulate them. In 1996, it flipped. Asserting that nicotine
is a "drug," it issued regulations prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to minors and regulating other activities that were
likely to promote or facilitate smoking among minors. 8 The
regulations were challenged by tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers on the ground that the statute simply
does not extend to tobacco products. The U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina upheld the regulations9; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed10; and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, concluding
that the FFDCA does not grant the FDA jurisdiction over
these products. 11
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the five-Justice
majority (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) concluded that Congress had
precluded FDA regulation of tobacco. Although acknowledging that the agency's position rested on a plausible reading of the actual text of the statute, the majority emphasized
the importance of context in statutory interpretation 12 and
examined the statute as a whole and the overall legislative
scheme. It made two basic points. First, as it read the statute,
if the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco, it would have no
choice but to ban tobacco products, but Congress had expressly precluded such a step. Therefore, tobacco products
"simply do not fit" within the FFDCA scheme and the
agency's reading of the statute was nonsensical. 13 Second,

u.s.c. §§301-395.

1. 1be author is currently Visiting Professor of Law at the New York
University School of Law. He is a professor at the Cardozo School of Law,
Yeshiva University, where he has taught since 1988. Previously, he was an
attorney for the Environmental Defense Fund and a law clerk for Justice
Byron White. He is a graduate of Swarthmore College and the University
of Chicago Law School.

6.

21

7.

Id. §§32l(g)-(h), 393.

2.
15 U.S.C. §§2601-2692, ELR STAT. TSCA §§2-412 (Toxic
Substances Control Act). See id. §2602(2)(A)(iii), ELR STAT. TSCA
§3(2)(A)(iii) (defining "chemical substance" to exclude "tobacco or any
tobacco product").

9.
Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 996 F. Supp. 1374
(M.D.N.C. 1997).

8.
Food & Drug Admin., Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and
Adolescents, 42 Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996).

10. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153
F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1999).

3.
See Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F.
Supp. 2d 435, 28 ELR 21445 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (vacating large
portions of a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report on
passive smoking).

11. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S.
Ct. 1291 (2000).

4.

120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).

13. Id. at 1301-06.

5.

467 U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984).

12. Id. at 1300-01.
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the Court emphasized Congress' actions, and inaction, regarding the regulation of tobacco since 1965-a period long
after the passage of the FFDCA. It noted Congress' repeated
consideration and rejection of bills that would have given
the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, its "specific intent" in
six pieces oflegislation directly addressing tobacco, and the
fact that all such legislation was enacted against the background of and in reliance on the FDA's assertion that it could
not regulate tobacco. According to the majority, this added
up to more than "simple inaction by Congress that purportedly represents it acquiescence in an agency's position";
rather, through actual legislation, Congress had "effectively
ratified the FDA's previous position." 14
Finally, the majority turned to Chevron. As the first
two sections of the opinion presaged, it declined to defer to
the agency's interpretation, staying squarely in Chevron's
step one. It had two complementary reasons for doing so.
First, for the reasons summarized above, it thought the statute was clear and dispositive. Second, the Court was unwilling to treat whatever ambiguity there might be (and it was
unwilling to admit there was much) as an implicit delegation
given the nature of the issue. It deemed it unlikely that Congress would have delegated such a momentous, politically
charged, and consequential decision to the FDA, at least not
without a clearer and more direct statement. 15 Relying on an
idea generally associated with Justice Breyer, and citing an
article by him, 16 the Court noted that whether Congress has
delegated decisionmaking authority to an agency turns in
part on the nature and importance of the issue; the more significant the issue, the less likely that Congress has handed it
to an agency.
Writing for the four dissenters-Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-Justice Breyer took the opposite tack on each of the three parts of the majority's opinion. He briefly made the point that the language and purpose
of the FFDCA supported the FDA's assertion of jurisdiotion.17 This is hard to quarrel with, and the majority had not
done so. Justice Breyer then turned to the majority's reasons
for ignoring the natural reading of the statute. First, he offered a reading of the statute under which the FDA could
14. Id. at 1306-14.
15. Id. at 1314-15.
16. Id. (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review ofQuestions ofLaw and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986)).
17. Id. at 1316-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 1322-26.
19. Id. at 1326.
20. Id. at 1328-30.
21. Id. at 1320-21, 1328-31.
22. This was the approach taken by the government In its reply brief, for
example, the FDA asserted:
The relevant indicia of congressional intent .. . do not come
close to establishing that Congress "directly addressed the
precise question at issue" and "unambiguously expressed
[its] intent" that tobacco products fall outside the reach of the
FDCA. 467 U.S. at 843. To the contrary, the text, legislative
history, and administrative interpretation of the Act strongly
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regulate tobacco without banning it, thereby avoiding the
majority's conundrum that the only permissible regulatory
action was in fact impermissible. 18 Second, he expressed
grave doubts about relying on later congressional inaction
or enactments to understand existing statutes. Emphasizing
that Congress had never directly come to grips with the
question of FDA authority, he observed that after the FDA
had asserted jurisdiction Congress considered but failed to
enact legislation to deny it such authority. Thus the legislative record was, in Breyer's slightly peculiar phrase, "critically ambivalent." 19 Finally, Justice Breyer argued that
changes in available information-both as to the activities
of the tobacco companies and as to scientific understanding-along with a policy change accompanying a change of
presidential administration, amply justified the FDA's shift
in position.20
Justice Breyer cited Chevron, but only in passing,
and his arguments rest much more on the FFDCA itself than
on a pitch for deference. At times he uses the language and
concepts of Chevron step two, asserting that the FDA's interpretation was not "unreasonable" and emphasizing the
policymaking freedom and democratic accountability of the
agency. 21 But much of the opinion is devoted to refuting the
majority's interpretation of the Act directly and concluding
that, correctly interpreted, the FFDCA itself grants the FDA
the asserted authority. And Justice Breyer seems almost intentionally to eschew the "step one" and "step two" language and dichotomy. If one were to impose that vocabulary
onto the opinion, one would say that Justice Breyer concluded: (a) that this was a Chevron step one case because the
statute gives the FDA authority to regulate tobacco, and
(b) that the statute is at most ambiguous and therefore, under step two, the Court had to defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation. 22 But that is not what Justice Breyer
himself says.

III. Understanding Brown & Williamson
The opinions in Brown & Williamson invite two sorts of obvious criticisms. The first is that the Court ignored Chevron
and failed appropriately to defer to the FDA. 23 For example,
support FD A's conclusion that, given the overwhelming evidence that the nicotine in tobacco products is intended to be
used to sustain addiction and as a sedative, stimulant, and appetite suppressant, tobacco products are drug-delivery devices within the meaning of the FDCA. At the very least,
FDA's conclusion is based on "a permissible construction"
of the Act. Ibid.
Reply Brief for the Petitioner Food and Drug Administration at 19,
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120
S. Ct. 1291 (2000) (No. 98-1152).
23. This was a repeated objection to the Fourth Circuit's decision, which
the Supreme Court affirmed. See, e.g., Joseph A. Fazioli, Chevron Up in
Smoke?: Tobacco at the Crossroads ofAdministrative Law, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PuB. PoL'Y 1057 (1999); Michael R. McPherson, The Denial of FDA
Jurisdiction Over Tobacco in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
FDA: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 3 QuINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 133,
153-54 (1999-2000); Marguerite Sullivan, Brown & Williamson v. FDA·
Finding Congressional Intent Through Creative Statutory
Interpretation-A Departure From Chevron, 94 Nw. L. REv. 273 (1999);
Casenote, 112 HARV. L. REV. 572 (1998).
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writing in a previous issue of the Environmental Law Reporter, Jim O'Reilly entitled his Article about the decision
"Chevron Goes Up in Smoke" and asserted that the Court
"distort[ed] the Chevron standard. " 24 And, before the Fourth
Circuit or the Supreme Court had ruled, Cass Sunstein wrote
a nuanced defense of the FDA's regulation that emphasized
Chevron and the role of agencies in refining and updating
congressional enactments. 2!l My own view is that the Court's
Chevron analysis was basically correct and consistent with
its own past practice. Right or wrong, both the majority and
the dissenting <;>pinions have important lessons for the future
application of Chevron, which I explore in Part III.A.
The second predictable criticism of the Brown & Williamson opinions concerns the methodology of statutory interpretation. In this era of struggle between "textualists" and
"intentionalists," it is striking that the Court's more conservative members-including, without a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia-joined an opinion that virtually ignores the text of the provision at issue. The Court instead
rests on a "clear" congressional "intent" that is "expressed
in the FFDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific legislation that it has enacted subsequent to
the FFDCA,"26 but, awkwardly, not in the directly applicable text itself. At the same time, the more liberal members of
the Court, including the two leading proponents ofa reliance
on legislative history, Justices Stevens and Breyer, 27 here
sound like Scalian formalists, both in style and substance,
admonishing that "a legislative atmosphere is not a law, unless it is embodied in a statutory word or phrase."28
Whatever the merits of one interpretative approach
over the other, there has been some convenient trading of
methodologies here, which I explore in Part III.B. Beyond
that, the Court's reliance on post-enactment developments
has direct relevance to at least one critical environmental issue that is now being litigated: the question whether EPA
must consider costs in setting national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS). I tum to that issue in Part IV.

A. The Application and Scope of Chevron in and After
Brown & Williamson
At the time it was decided, and in the ensuing yea,rs, Chevron
was seen as a blow to environmental groups. The specific
regulation upheld by the Court-applying the "bubble policy" to new source review requirements in nonattainment
areas-had been a Reagan Administration initiative, reversing the ostensibly more environmentally protective position
that had been taken by the Carter Administration. More
broadly and importantly, the message of strong judicial deference to agency decisions that the Chevron decision contained, or that the lower courts later discovered in it, was
threatening to environmental groups. In the eyes of enviNm24. James T. O'Reilly, Chevron Goes Up in Smoke: Did the Supreme
Court Reward Gridlock Tactics in the Cigarette Decision?, 30 ELR
10574, 10575 (July 2000).
25. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as
Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1998).
26. 120 S. Ct. at 1297.
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mentalists, the deferential stance would lead to the loss of
hard-won congressional gains because the federal judiciary
consisting primarily of Democratic appointees would yield
to Republican agency preferences rather than interpreting
and enforcing largely Democratic statutes themselves.
I was an attorney with the Environmental Defense
Fund in the mid-1980s, and I recall more than one worried
strategy discussion among lawyers for environmental
groups working on briefs that actually supported a particular agency decision. There was real concern that any reliance on Chevron might help win the battle but would ultimately lead to losing the war. It seemed clear to us that, because the agency was the usual opponent, the environmentally preferable approach was to downplay Chevron in order
to preserve a strong judicial role in overseeing agency
decisionmaking and enforcing congressional decisions.
And surely the first generation of Chevron articles-in
which conservatives embraced and liberals attacked the decision-can be suspected of being motivated (at least a little, if only subconsciously) by the authors' substantive preference for the outcomes they expected from the judiciary as
opposed to those they expected from agencies.
How times have changed. With a federal judiciary at
least until recently dominated by Reagan and Bush appointees, a Republican Congress, and a Democratic administration, the constellation of players and forces has completely
shifted. Now a strong reading of Chevron means greater
agency autonomy, which means more vigorous regulation.
As a result, the endorsements and attacks on strong deference are coming from opposite quarters. 29
1. The Supreme Court's Chevron Analysis in Brown &
Williamson
This realignment was nowhere more clear than leading up
to, and in the wake of, the tobacco case. As in Chevron itself,
though in a more consequential and visible setting, the tobacco case arose because a federal agency had abandoned a
prior policy and adopted a new reading of its statute. This
time, however, the new reading delighted activists and dismayed the regulated community, as it promised significant
new regulatory burdens rather than increasing the flexibility
of existing ones. Citing Chevron, but not in fact deferring to
the agency, the Court held that the agency's action was inconsistent with the statute. As a result, some have celebrated
the decision for its antiregulatory effects. One lawyer for the
prevailing side has written that "[t]obacco companies are
not the only beneficiaries of the decision," which "also
promises relief to other victims of over-zealous agency regulation whose statutory challenges too often founder on

21. See generally Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization ofLegislative
History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205.

28. 120 S. Ct. at 1331.
29. As this is written, the November 2000 election has yet to occur; it
could, of course, again realign the players.
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simplistic readings of' Chevron. 30
That assessment should be modified slightly. Brown
& Williamson promises relief to those affected by over-zealous agency action-whether it be regulation or deregulation-where "over-zealous" is defined as "inconsistent with
the relevant statute." But in asserting meaningful judicial
oversight, Brown & Williamson is not new. Rather, while inconsistent with much of the received wisdom about Chevron, the Court's approach is consistent with a proper reading
of that decision.
Certainly Brown & Williamson is consistent with the
Supreme Court's actual practice, which has been consistently nondeferential. Professor Thomas Merrill has confirmed this general impression: the Supreme Court has not
been more deferential to agency interpretations since Chevron was decided than it was before. 31 Sometimes the Court
cites Chevron but does not defer, as in Brown & Williamson;
other times it does not even cite Chevron. 32
The Court's apparent failure to follow its own teachings can give rise to two responses: either we can shake our
heads about the Court's lack of self-restraint, orwe can wonder whether we have misunderstood the supposedly neglected teachings. I would suggest that the latter is the case.
The Court's actual practice, while no doubt inconsistent in
its specifics and from time to time in error, overall reflects
the appropriate understanding of Chevron. In Brown & Williamson, all nine Justices were trying to determine the better
reading of the statute. That was not self-evident. Statutory
meaning is never self-evident in a case that makes it all the
way to the Supreme Court. (And what better proof, or definition, of "ambiguity" can there be than a 5-4 division
among Supreme Court Justices?) But not one of the Justices
seemed to think that such "ambiguity" triggered step two of
Chevron and required deference to the agency. Rather, both
the majority and the dissent grappled with text, purpose, history, common sense, and legal context-in Chevron's terms,
"the traditional tools of statutory construction"33-to reach
a conclusion as to the statute's meaning.
To be more precise, all nine Justices were trying to
determine the statutory boundaries on agency action. Five
Justices thought that the FFDCA precluded FDA regulation
of tobacco; that is a Chevron step-one inquiry. The four dis-

senters concluded that the statute allowed but did not require
FDA regulation of tobacco. That is also a step-one inquiry.
The case illustrates the simple proposition that in any case of
administrative action under statutory limits, a court must determine the boundaries of agency authority. "Congress may
have given an agency lots of room or almost none, but the
boundaries are by definition set by Congress and hence for
judicial identification. " 34
Consider in this regard Justice Breyer's discussion of
the FDA's flip-flop as to its authority to regulate tobacco.
Majority and dissent correctly agree that an agency's reversal does not defeat or dilute Chevron deference. 35 But Justice
Breyer attacks the majority for nonetheless holding the FDA
to its initial interpretation, despite what he argues are more
than ample reasons for the flip-flop. Just as the majority had
cited Justice Breyer's article against him, so here Justice
Breyer invokes Chief Justice Rehnquist's well-known separate opinion in the air bags case. In that opinion, then-Justice
Rehnquist had defended shifts in agency policies that followed on the arrival of new presidential administrations:
"As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the
administration." 36 But Justice Breyer is not exactly hoisting
the majority on its own petard here. It is a complete response
to Justice Breyer to italicize the opening qualifier: as long as
the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress. Whether the agency has done so is always, and by definition, a judicial, step-one inquiry. The Brown & Williamson majority concluded that the agency had overstepped
those bounds.
Whether the majority was correct in that conclusion,
I do not know. But at the level of methodology, there was
nothing striking or untoward about the opinion. Indeed,
viewing Brown & Williamson in Chevron terms, there was
no significant disagreement; the majority and the dissent
adopted essentially the same methodology, they just disagreed about what the statute meant.

30. Thomas W. Kirby, Giving Agencies Less Deference Tobacco
Decision Looked Broadly for Congress ' Intent, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 27,

Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1,
26 (1983). See also Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(deferring "to an agency's interpretation constitutes a judicial
detennination that Congress has delegated the norm-elaboration function
to the agency"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985).

2000, at 66.
31 . Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994). The decision does seem to have
led to a greater respect for agency decisions in the courts of appeals. See
Aaron P. Avila, Application ofthe Chevron Doctrine in the D. C. Circuit, 8
N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 308 (2000); Peter H. Schuck& E. Donald Elliott, To
the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law,
1990 DUKE L.J. 984.
32. For one of many examples, see Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 120
S. Ct. 1815, 30 ELR 20566 (2000).
33. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, 14 ELR at 20508-09 n.9.
34. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation
and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187,221 (1992).
As Professor Monaghan wrote the year before Chevron came down,
"[j]udicial deference to agency 'interpretation' oflaw is simply one way of
recognizing a delegation of law making authority to an agency." Henry P.

2. The Scope of Chevron After Brown

& Williamson

So where does that leave us with regard to Chevron's scope?

35. See Food & Drug Adrnin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
120 S. Ct. 1291, 1313 (2000)("Certainly, an agency's initial interpretation
of a statute that it is charged with administering is not 'carved in stone."')
(quoting Chevron, 467U.S. at 863, 14 ELRat20514); id. at 1328 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he FDA' s change of positions does not make a
significant legal difference."). Chevron itself, of course, involved a new
and contradictory agency position that merited "Chevron deference."
36. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass' n of the United States v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59, 13 ELR 20672, 20680 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring and dissenting), quoted in Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct.
at 1330 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Three central, recurrent, and related issues arise with regard
to the scope of step one. First, does mere ambiguity or uncertainty as to statutory meaning trigger step two? Second, if
so, how compelling must a particular interpretation be to
keep a court from deferring? Must Congress really have addressed "the precise question at issue," 37 or might a court
conclude that Congress came close enough for government
work? How clear is clear?38 Is it enough that a court feels
confident that it has identified the "better" of two or more
plausible readings, 39 or must it be convinced that there is
only one plausible interpretation? Third, what materials
should a court examine in making that determination?
Should it examine only "the plain language of the statute,"40 or should it consider other sources of statutory
meaning, such as legislative history, purpose, or policy, as
it did in Chevron itself? 41 Brown & Williamson helps answer these questions.
First, the Court confirms that ambiguity itself can be
an implicit delegation of decisionmaking authority to the
agency triggering step two.42 This approach is mistaken, I
think, but I am not the Supreme Court.
Second, it has little directly to say on the "how clear is
clear'' question, which is by its nature frustratingly hard to
pin down. There is no metric for quantifying statutory clarity and no mechanism for policing judicial assertions that a
disputed text is "clear." Judges tend to be, or at least pretend
to be, pretty confident in their conclusions. Hence the
not-so-rare-as-one-might-think phenomenon of all judges
in a case agreeing that a statute is clear but disagreeing as
to what it clearly means. For what it is worth, two conflicting hints can be found in the majority opinion. On the
one hand, it at least purports to set the bar of clarity rather
high. It expressed little doubt and was confident that it
had found the "clear intent" of Congress. On the other
hand, the statute undeniably was ambiguous, given the
conflict between text and context, but the majority stayed
in step one notwithstanding.
Much more importantly, the majority emphasized a
second variable besides the clarity, or lack thereof, of the
statute: an inquiry into "the nature of the question presented." In some cases, apparently, a particular level of ambiguity will trigger step two, and in some cases it will not.
Whether it does so depends on whether it makes sense to
presume that Congress has indeed handed over the
decisionmaking authority to the agency. "[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an

agency in so cryptic a fashion.''43 The Court's language and
approach suggest that it will not defer under Chevron on major, politically salient issues, even if the statutory language
is unclear. Put differently, Chevron deference hinges on a
policymaking delegation, and while the requisite delegation
can sometimes be found simply through Congress' use of
vague language, such an implicit delegation will be found
only for minor, ·interstitial questions.
Finally, with regard to the materials to be consulted
within step one, it is notable that all nine Justices operated
within a very broad step one, in which they looked well beyond the language, plain or otherwise, of the provision at issue. As in Chevron itself, the "traditional tools of statutory
interpretation" were broadly understood. In Chevron, the
Court deferred only when those tools proved fruitless; in
Brown & Williamson it did not need to defer because those
tools provided a satisfactorily firm answer. I consider just
what those tools were in the next section. For present purposes, the point is simply that they go far beyond the language of the text. The step-one mansion has many rooms.

31. Chevron, 461 U.S. at 842, 14 ELR at 20508.

of the statute to the facts, what would it have looked
like-would we have told our client it was a relatively
close question?
40. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp.,
503 U.S. 407,417 (1992) ("If the agency interpretation is not in conflict
with the plain language of the statute, deference is due.").

38. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of I.Aw, 1989 DUKE L.J. 5ll, 520-21 (predicting that Chevron battles
would tum on the question of "how clear is clear").
39. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of I.Aw and
Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821 , 826-27:
Of course I can-as can any judge-always determine which
of the parties has the better interpretation of a statute, but as I
understand and appreciate Chevron, it imposes a discipline
on judges to stop and ask ourselves this question: if we, as
counselor for the petitioner or general counsel of the agency,
had been asked to write an opinion letter on the applicability

B. Acquiescence, Ratification, and Post-Enactment
Legislative History
The striking feature of the majority's opinion is its reliance
on legislative developments that came after passage of the
directly applicable statute. The individual Justices in the
Brown & Williamson majority are usually wary about relying on legislative history generally, and post-enactment legislative history in particular, and have shied away from the
idea oflegislative acquiescence or ratification of judicial or
administrative interpretations.
What effect should actions taken by a legislator or a
legislature after a statute is enacted have on our understanding of that statute? Two polar positions are easily identified.
At one extreme, legislative action or inaction subsequent to
enactment simply has no bearing whatsoever on the statute's meaning; at the other, interpreters must be continually
alert to current legislative understandings or preferences.
Courts tend to fall between these poles in practice, although
closer to the first.
In part, the magnetic pull of these poles depends on
exactly what kind of evidence of post-enactment legislative
understanding is at issue. Statements by an individual legislator, or even a committee, about the meaning of a past enactment are almost always rejected out-of-hand and are generally seen as the weakest sort of indication oflegislative in-

41. Chevron,461U.S. at851 -54, 862-64, 14ELRat2051 l,20513-14.
42. Food & Drug Adrnin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S.
Ct. 1291, 1314 (2000).
43 . Id. at 1315.
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tent 44 Thus, in Environmental Defense Fund v. City of Chicago,45 which held that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's46 household waste exemption does not apply to
ash from waste-to-energy incinerators, the plaintiffs relied
on letters from an individual U.S. representative and six
U.S. senators to the EPA Administrator. Appearing more
than three years after the relevant provision had been enacted (and, suspiciously and surely not coincidentally, on
the same day), the letters set out their authors' view that
Congress had not exempted ash from subtitle C regulation.
While agreeing with this reading of the statute, the court of
appeals dismissed the letters as simply irrelevant: "post-enactment statements, such as we have here, bear no neces~ary
relationship to the forces at work at the time of enactment,
the preferences of the enacting legislator and his or her constituency, and the impact of pressure groups. "47 This disdain
for post-enactment legislative history is typical. 48
It is important to see why this is the standard approach. The essential concern with post-enactment legislative history of this sort is its reliability. There is almost no
reason to trust, and every reason to be suspicious of, the individual member of Congress who says "this is what we meant
five years ago." Given the passage of time, the incentive for
strategic deception of others and of oneself, the absence of
any check on or consequences from what is said, the possibility of individual changes of mind, and the fact that no one
is listening, individual statements made after the fact are
useless at best as indicators of the prevailing understanding
or purpose at the time of enactment.
Courts have been less quick to dismiss another sort of
post-enactment legislative history: the failure of Congress
to amend a statute that has been given a particular judicial or
administrative interpretation. Courts not infrequently take
congressional inaction as approval of a prevailing interpretation. The best-known example of this approach is Flood v.
Kuhn, 49 in which the Supreme Court stood by its long-standing, though peculiar, reading of the antitrust laws to exempt
professional baseball. But the Court has been completely inconsistent with regard to this approach; relying on it heavily
in some cases, rejecting it in others. 50
44. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,
281-82 (1947). In a well-known and typically memorable statement,
Justice Scalia once objected to the Court's going to the trouble of
explicitly rejecting, in a footnote, the losing party's reliance on statements
in committee documents produced after passage of the statute at issue:
"Arguments based on subsequent legislative history . .. should not be
taken seriously, not even in a footnote." Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S.
617,632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (joining all of the Court's opinion
except for the offending footnote) .
45. 511 U.S. 328, 24 ELR 20810 (1994).

46.

42 U.S.C. §§6901-6992k, ELR STAT. RCRA §§1001-11011
(Rcsowce Conservation and Recovery Act).
47. Environmental Defense Fund v. City of Chicago, 948 F.2d 345, 351,
22ELR20125, 20128 (7th Cir. 1991),a.ff'd, 511 U.S. 328, 24 ELR20810
(1994). Justice Scalia authored the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the
Seventh Circuit; not surprisingly, he did not mention the letters. See also
511 U.S. at 337, 24 ELR at 20812 (briefly dismissing any reliance on the
Senate Committee Report, since "it is the statute, and not the Committee
Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law").
48. "We have observed on more than one occasion that the interpretation
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There are two sorts of objections to relying on Congress' failure to amend a statute as an indication of the correctness of the prevailing interpretation. One concern is,
again, reliability. As many have pointed out, legislative inaction can have all sorts of explanations other than approval
of the status quo, including ignorance, the press of other
business, disagreement as to what should replace the prevailing error, confusion over what the status quo is, filibuster or other minority procedural maneuver, fear of a presidential veto, or all manner of political calculations. 51 The
other objection is quite different; it attacks not the accuracy
of the inference of congressional approval but its relevance.
Under traditional understandings, legislation survives its
enacting coalition; a later Congress can alter a predecessor's
action only by amending it; courts look to the "legislative intent" of the enacting legislature. Justice Scalia has made this
point with some force in an opinion for the Court:
"Only time will tell," [the dissent] says, "whether the
Court ... has correctly interpreted the will of Congress."
The implication is that today's holding will be proved
wrong if Congress amends the law to conform with [the
interpretation advanced by the] dissent. We think not.
The "will of Congress" we look to is not a will evolving
from Session to Session, but a will expressed and fixed
in a particular enactment. Otherwise, we would speak
not of"interpreting" the law but of"intuiting" or "predicting" it. Our role is to say what the law, as hitherto
enacted1 is; not to forecast what the law, as amended,
will be.' 2

On this theory, the views of later Congresses-the inactive
ones-are simply irrelevant to the meaning of the statute.
Congress cannot acquiesce in or ratify an interpretation by
leaving it alone; the only constitutionally relevant action it
can take is to make laws, pursuant to the constitutionally
prescribed procedures. Even if a court were utterly confident that the current Congress concurred in a judicial or administrative reading of a statute, that fact would be irrelevant to the correct interpretation of the statute. Congressional silence, like the legislative veto, is not a constitutionally

given by one Congress (or a Committee or Member thereof) to an earlier
statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute."
Public Employees' Rct. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989).
49. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
50. An inconsistency it acknowledged in one of the most striking
examples of a refusal to accept the legislative ratification argument,
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994) (5-4) (holding that Securities and Exchange Act §lO(b) docs not
create a private right of action against those who aided and abetted stock
fraud). In rejecting an interpretation that had prevailed for 60 years, the
Court pooh-poohed any reliance on legislative inaction as support for that
interpretation. However, it did observe that "[i]t is true that our cases have
not been consistent in rejecting arguments such as these." Id. at 187.
51. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633,
650 (1990); HENRY M . HART JR. & ALBERT M . SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS 1358-60 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickcy eds.,
1994).
52. West Va. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101-02 n.7 (1991).

NEWS & ANALYSIS

2-2001

permissible manner of "legislating."53
In considering these objections, two versions of the
acquiescence argument should be distinguished. The
weaker version is acquiescence in the form of complete inaction. In terms of both reliability and relevance, mere congressional failure to override a judicial or administrative interpretation is easiest to attack. The stronger version is
sometimes called "the reenactment rule." It is a particularized application of the same principle, but in circumstances
where the objections are less compelling. As the Court put
it many years ago, "the reenactment by Congress, without
change, of a statute, which had previously received long
continued executive construction, is an adoption by Congress of such construction. " 54 The practical concerns about
reliability are diminished here, because there is an indication that Congress has in fact been paying attention and
made a conscious, deliberate decision. And the theoretical
concerns about relevance are diminished because Congress has in fact legislated, the issue is only the meaning
that should be attached to its action. Nonetheless,
reenactment only reduces these concerns, it does not eliminate them.
This debate over later legislative developments is itself part of a larger debate about whether statutory meaning
and statutory interpretation can be, should be, or unavoidably are, dynamic. 55 That debate will not be resolved here.
Two points bear mentioning, however, with regard to Brown
& Williamson.
First, the methodologies of the individual Justices are
notable -not jaw-dropping, but certainly eyebrow-raising.
The conservative wing, which formed the majority, is generally associated with varying degrees of skepticism or hostility to extra-textual sources generally, post-enactment legislative history in particular, and any notion of evolving statutory meaning. These Justices take a rather formal view of
what constitutes binding statutory law and are reluctant to
look beyond the applicable statutory text itself. Yet it is the
majority that essentially ignores the text of the statute and
instead relies on legal developments occurring years after its
enactment. The Justices in the liberal wing, who dissented in
Brown & Williamson, are generally associated with a more
broad ranging investigation of statutory meaning, a review
53 . See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.l (1989)
(rejecting legislative acquiescence argument because "Congress may
legislate ... only through the passage of a bill which is approved by both
Houses and signed by the President" and "Congressional inaction cannot
amend a duly enacted statute"); cf Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 13 ELR 20663 (1983) (striking down legislative
veto because it was a type of "legislation" that did not result from
constitutionally prescribed procedures).
54. United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337, 339
(1908). See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978)
("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judi'eial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts
a statute without change.").
55. One professor has labeled this

the most fundamental issue about statutory interpretation.
Should interpreters regard a statutory enactment as fixed in
time, not giving weight to events after passage, or should they
take statutory language as an evolving part of the whole body
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of overall legal context, and a willingness to abandon text.
Yet it is the dissent that relies on text and formalistically insists that the only relevant act a legislature can take is to enact or amend a statute directly-in Justice Breyer's phrase,
"a legislative atmosphere is not a law, unless it is embodied
in a statutory word or phrase."56
Complaints about methodological inconsistencies
on the part ofindividual Justices are common, they are easy
to make, and they are often well-founded. But they do not
get you very far. On the one hand, ofcourse Supreme Court
Justices, like everyone (and like lawyers more than most),
are not perfectly consistent. It's so obvious a point as almost
not to be interesting. On the other hand, it is easily and often
overstated. The opinions in Brown & Williamson are not
quite the about-face that they may seem to be. The majority
insists that this was not a run-of-the-mill legislative acquiescence case. 57 It felt compelled to portray this as an unusual
situation, unlike the myriad cases in which Congress has
done nothing in the face of an accepted interpretation. The
majority's point was that the long-standing interpretation
had been woven into the fabric of the law; Congress had not
simply left it alone, it had relied on it, legislated around it,
and developed an overall regulatory scheme that depended
on it. If this description is accurate (the dissenters were unconvinced), it makes the strongest case for relying on later
congressional action to inform one's understanding of an
earlier statute-not just acquiescence, nor even just
reenactment, but, in the Court's words, "effective ratification." Taken at face value, the majority addresses the concerns of both reliability and relevance discussed above.
As one with no particular familiarity with food and
. drug law, I cannot speak to the validity of the majority's
reading of the particular laws in question. But I found its argument a plausible interpretation of what Congress had
done. More important, it was not only a coherent but a welcome approach at the methodological level.
Similarly, the dissent does not wholly retreat into
narrow formalism, rejecting any examination of post-enactment events and overall context. To a significant extent, it
meets the majority on its own terms, contesting that the specific conclusions it draws from the specific congressional
actions over the years. Moreover, it accepts a sort of dyof the law, considering various post-enactment events as affecting how the language should be understood?
KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS
227 (1999).
56. l 20 S. Ct. at 1331 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Cf In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d
1340, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook. J.) ("An opinion poll
revealing the wishes of Congress would not translate to legal rules.
Desires become rules only after clearing procedural hurdles . ..."). Justice
Breyer also invokes Justice Scalia' s not-even-in-a-footnote line. 120 S.
Ct. at 1326; see supra note 44.

57. As if seeking to limit the damage, the Court was at pains to stress just
how unusual the sort of legislative action on which it relied was: "We do
not rely on Congress' failure to act-its consideration and rejection of
bills that would have given the FDA this authority-in reaching this
conclusion. Indeed, this is not a case of simple inaction by Congress that
purportedly represents its acquiescence in an agency's position." 120 S.
Ct. at 1312.
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namic statutory meaning by endorsing the FDA's change
of position.
Notwithstanding the perfect conservative/liberal array of majority and dissenting Justices, then, Brown & Williamson is not really an occasion for head-shaking about politicized, result-oriented jurisprudence on the Supreme
Court. Neither group simply abandoned its usual interpretive principles outright. However, the majority opinion is a
significant step toward a dynamic understanding of statutes,
and it countenances a fairly broad inquiry into sources of
statutory meaning beyond the particular text of the provision at issue. So one can be sure that future litigants will
latch on to the relatively open-ended approach take.n by the
majority and the relatively conservative approach taken by
the dissent.

IV. Brown & Williamson and American Trucking

Brown & Williamson will have an immediate application of
importance to environmental lawyers. Many of the methodological lessons are applicable in the most significant environmental case of the current Supreme Court term, American Trucking Ass 'n. 58
The Court granted two separate certiorari petitions
arising out of the D.C. Circuit's decision setting aside EPA's
new NAAQS for ozone and particulates. 59 In one, Browner
v. American Trucking Ass 'n, EPA challenges the D.C. Circuit's ruling that Clean Air Act (CAA)§ 109, at least as interpreted by the agency, is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority. Though not directly relevant to that issue, Brown & Williamson suggests that the Court will not
find an unconstitutional delegation. In the other case, American Trucking Ass 'n v. Browner, industry groups are challenging the D.C. Circuit's ruling that EPA cannot consider
costs or economic effects when setting a NAAQS. On that
issue, Brown & Williamson argues in favor of affirming the
court of appeals.
58. Browner v. American Trucking Ass'n, cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003
(2000) (No. 99-1257); American Trucking Ass'n v. Browner, cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (No. 99-1426).
59. AmericanTruckingAss'n v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027, 29ELR21071
(D.C. Cir.), petition for rehearing granted in part and denied in part and
opinion modified, 195 F.3d 4, 30 ELR 20119 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
60. Four excellent discussions are Thomas J. McGarity, The Clean Air
Act at a Crossroads: Statutory Interpretation and Longstanding
Administrative Practice in the Shadow of the Delegation Doctrine, 9
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2000); Craig N. Oren, Run Over by American
Trucking Part I: Can EPA Revive Its Air Quality Standards?, 29 ELR
10653 (Nov. 1999); Richard J. Pierce, The Inherent Limits on Judicial
Control of Agency Discretion: The D.C. Circuit and the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 63 (2000), and Cass R. Sunstein, ls the
Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303 (1999).
61. 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(l), ELR STAT. CAA §109(b)(l); see also id.
§7408(a)(2), ELR STAT. CAA§ 108(a)(2) (describing airqualitycriteria).
62. Two standard examples are "the benzene case," Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 10 ELR
20489 (1980) (upholding statutory directive that agency establish
standards that are "reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment or places of employment"), and the World War II
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A. Nondelegation
The nondelegation ruling by the court of appeals has received a great deal of attention, most of it highly critical. 60
Two aspects of the D.C. Circuit's opinion produced the most
head-scratching. First, the relevant provision, CAA
§109(b)(l), requires EPA to establish primary NAAQS
"requisite to protect the public health," "allowing for an adequate margin of safety," and "based on" criteria documents
described in CAA §108. 61 Though open-ended, this just
does not seem any more vague and standardless than any
number of statutes that the Court has upheld against
nondelegation challenges. 62 Second, the court of appeals
thought that the statutory defect could be cured by a controlling agency interpretation. It acknowledged that this
would not serve a central purpose of the nondelegation
doctrine, viz. ensuring that the elected legislature makes
the significant policy decisions. But the court thought an
agency interpretation would serve the two other purposes:
allowing for meaningful judicial review and preventing arbitrary and inconsistent agency actions. 63 Brown & Williamson suggests that the Court will be unconvinced by the
D.C. Circuit's reasoning.
To be sure, Brown & Williamson can be seen as displaying a judicial wariness toward excessive agency authority. But the more important lesson lies in the Court's reaction
to the FDA's claim of broad delegated power. That reaction
was two-fold. First, the Court worked hard to find a particular, clear congressional intent that precluded the agency's
action. The dissenters, too, were confident that the statute
contained significant standards by which to judge the
agency action. While the FFDCA and related statutes perhaps gave the Court more to work with than does CAA
§ 109, the latter is hardly so empty and meaningless that
judges will be forced to throw up their hands. Second, in the
context of Chevron, the Court invoked the Breyerian principle that a court should not find a delegation of policymaking
authority to an agency when the circumstances would suggest that the issues are the fundamental sort that one would
price controls case, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)
( upholding authorization to agency to fix prices of commodities which "in
his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the
purposes of this Act").
63. This reasoning is hard to fathom. These ideas make lots of sense in the
adjudicatory setting, when the agency is applying general principles in a
series of individual enforcement contexts. They are all but inapplicable in
the rulemaking setting. There is little value in judicial review to ensure that
an agency's rule is consistent with its (discretionary) interpretation of the
provision under which the rule is promulgated. And the arbitrariness
concern is diluted to the point of nonexistence when the agency is
promulgating a generally applicable rule. The consequence of the D.C.
Circuit's requirement is that an agency can (and presumably will) do
exactly what it otherwise would have, just in two steps. To be sure, the
agency's self-restraining interpretation might ensure consistency from
one rulemaking to the next. But these equality interests are hardly
compelling; it just is not that critical that emitters of particulate matter be
indirectly affected by a NAAQS set under the same approach as the
NAAQS that indirectly affects emitters of volatile organic compounds,
particularly since there will be all sorts of inequalities in the
implementation of the NAAQS. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the
agency can tie its hands in future rulemakings, especially if there is an
intervening presidential election.
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expect Congress itself to resolve. Thus, the Court is willing
to presume that Congress has not delegated to the agency basic, fundamental issues, and it will work to find the answers
to those issues in the statute. And, of course, if it finds such
answers, then the statute easily survives a nondelegation
challenge. Finally, all ohhis suggests that the Court will be
dubious about the D.C. Circuit's notion that the agency can
solve any nondelegation problem by tying its own hands.
These indicators of the Court's take on American
Trucking are not much more than tea leaves. Nonetheless,
they suggest that the Court will reject the lower court's
nondelegation ruling.

B. Reading the CAA
I. Congressional Ratification
Since its enactment in 1970, CAA §109 has been consistently understood by EPA and the courts to preclude consideration of costs in setting a primary NAAQS. When it promulgated the original set of six NAAQS in 1971, EPA made
clear its understanding that the CAA "does not permit any
factors other than health to be taken into account in setting
the primary standards.''64 It has never questioned or retreated from that understanding of the statute. That interpretation is now 30 years old-not quite as long-standing as the
interpretation the FDA had abandoned in Brown & Williamson, but an impressive run nonetheless. The D.C. Circuit
adopted the same interpretation in 1980 in Lead Industries
Ass 'n v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,65 and reaffirmed it on several occasions before doing so again in
American Trucking itself. 66
Before the Supreme Court, both EPA and certain of
its amici have invoked Brown & Williamson and argued that
Congress has "effectively ratified" this interpretation.67 The
argument is a compelling one. As in Brown & Williamson,
there is more here than mere acquiescence through inaction,
though there is certainly that. Congress considered and rejected legislation that would have altered the prevailing interpretation; it amended CAA § I 09 in other respects but left
the relevant language untouched. Perhaps most important, it
has repeatedly addressed the role of costs and feasibility in
the NAAQS regime through statutory amendments. It has
made a clear and considered decision to do so through provisions concerning implementation and· attainment of the
NAAQS rather than by modifying the process or standards
64. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (Apr. 30, 1971).
65. 647 F.2d 1130, 10 ELR 20643 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See id. at 1148, 10
ELR at 20651 ("[T]he statute and its legislative history make clear that
economic considerations play no part in the promulgation of ambient air
quality standards under Section 109.").
66. See American Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d388, 389, 28ELR20481 ,
20481 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 902
F.2d 962,973, 20 ELR 20891, 20896 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1092 (1991); American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176,
1185, 11 ELR20916, 20919 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034
(1982).
67. The ratification argument is made by the Solicitor General, see Brief
for the Federal Respondents at 27-31, and by a group of environmental
organizations, see Brief for Amici Curiae Environmental Defense et al. at
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for establishing the NAAQS themselves. As in Brown &
Williamson, Congress has accepted EPA's interpretation and
legislated "against the backdrop of the [EPA's and the D.C.
Circuit's] consistent and repeated statements it lacked authority" to consider costs, 68 addressing the costs issue elsewhere in the statute, and thus "effectively ratifying•'69 the
prevailing intell?retation.
2. Chevron and Gridlock
The foregoing should indicate that I do not think Chevron
will be much of an issue in American Trucking. Just as in
Brown & Williamson, the costs issue will likely be resolved
within step one, with, at the most, a passing statement that
even if the statute were less clear, the agency's interpretation
is a reasonable one.
The setting and posture of American Trucking, however, do shed some light on concerns about Chevron that
were voiced after Brown & Williamson came down. Writing
in these pages, Professor James O'Reilly expressed concern
that Brown & Williamson creates a "cigarette corollary" to
Chevron that verges on "anti-deference."70 The cigarette
corollary would deny deference where, over a period of
years, neither Congress nor the relevant agency has acted.
On this reading of Brown & Williamson, Congress' very
inaction, in the face of the agency's failure to assert jurisdiction, becomes a ratification of the absence of jurisdiction and precludes later assertions of authority, overwhelming ordinary principles of deference. O'Reilly fears
that future EPA regulation will be hamstrung by the cigarette corollary, because the environmental arena has seen a
similar pattern of congressional inaction coupled with occasional passage of relevant legislation against a particular
administrative backdrop.
The American Trucking case is a strong
counterexample to his concern, reminding us that in
many instances, the agency has acted. In those cases,
congressional dithering, gridlock, and legislating
around the edges may cement rather than foreclose an
expansive interpretation.
This is precisely the fear ofa group of five U.S. senators who have filed an amicus brief in American Trucking. 71
They object that
to read legislative inaction as approval would work a
wholesale redistribution of power from the Legislative
3-15. Several Members of Congress filed amicus briefs urging the Court to
reject any theory of legislative acquiescence or approval. See id., Brief for
Senator James M. Inhofe (R-Olda.) et al. at 17-31; BriefofSenator Orrin
Hatch (R-Utah) and Representative Tom Billey (R-Va.) at 23-25.
68. Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1306.
69. Id. at 1313.
70. O'Reilly, supra note 24, at 10574.
71. See Brief for Senators James M. Inhofe, Tim Hutchinson, Robert F.
BeMett, and George Voinovich as Amici Curiae in Support of
Cross-Petitioners, American Trucking Ass'n v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193
(2000) (No. 99-1426).
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to the Executive branch. No longer would Congress be
able to serve as a check on Executive power. Rather, the
Executive could readily act to extend the outer bounds of
its authority and if, for whatever reason, Congress did
not affinnatively act to check that excess, the Judiciary
would construe that inability as acquiescence. 72

Discounting the senators' personal stake and their lawyer's
rhetorical excess, one can see why the senators might be uneasy. For one of the many unusual things about the tobacco
case was that the Agency's historical interpretation had been
self-abnegating. In general, agencies are prone to read their
powers broadly, not narrowly. That is bureaucratic, if not
human, nature. For those most suspicious of government
bureaucracies, EPA may even head the list of ambitious
overreachers. Professor Todd Zywicki, lamenting "[t]he relentless 'mission creep' of the EPA," has written:
Bureaucrats seek larger budgets and greater power for
themselves. In order to sustain large payrolls and expansive powers, the EPA must actually be doing something.
An EPA that simply oversaw the implementation of
common law and market remedies would be a humble
and limited EPA. On the other hand, an EPA that relentlessly seeks to expand its authority and is engaged in an
ongoing review of existing and potential technologies,
reconsidering and rewriting existing regulations in light
of changing technology and market conditions, is a
much more powerful and lucrative agency. 73

Zywicki's analysis is not uncommon, has roots at least as
deep as The Federalist, and resonates with much real-world
experience. I do not think that EPA's performance can be explained solely in terms of a lust for power."' But there is
enough truth to this notion to suggest that Professor
O'Reilly's concerns may be overstated. Agencies do tend to
read their mandates broadly. Overall, the ratchet effect at
work in Brown & Williamson is, I think, more likely to operate in favor of agency authority than against it.
Two caveats are in order, however. First, many agencies, including EPA, read their mandates broadly but do so
very slowly. It can take an awfully long time for EPA to produce a set of regulations. Where the agency has failed to do
anything during a time of congressional dithering or legislating around the edges, then Brown & Williamson could
have the antiregulatory consequences described by Professor O'Reilly. Secondly, the Brown & Williamson approach
will work in favor of agency authority only if applied
even-handedly with regard to the regulatory initiatives at issue. If the five-Justice majority has a different approach in
72. Id. at 24.
Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and
Reform, 13 TuL. L. REv. 845, 890 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
73.

74. Neither does Zywicki, in fact. He also observes that many at EPA are
drawn to their jobs by a sense of mission and a personal commitment to
environmental protection. For Zywicki, this only compounds the problem.
"[T]rue believers" are especially prevalent in environmental
regulatory agencies. Because they personally need not consider the costs of such regulations, and are isolated from the
need to consider the trade-off between environmental purity
and other social goals, such as economic development, those
passionately committed to the environmentalist cause will
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cases where an agency has long asserted that it does have a
regulatory power, then too Brown & Williamson will have
the antiregulatory consequences O'Reilly fears.
3. Dynamic Interpretation
Not long after the November 1994 elections, when the Contract With America was still a potent political document and
a revolution seemed to be occurring in Washington, Professor John Nagle wrote a review of the leading academic defense of "dynamic statutory interpretation," Professor William Eskridge's book of that title. 75 Nagle argued against the
dynamic approach. Using the Contract With America as a
jumping-offpoint, he suggested that a court truly committed
to Eskridge's approach should "update" existing statutes in
light of the clear, though unenacted, preferences ofthe 104th
Congress. Notwithstanding his substantial agreement with
much of the Republican regulatory agenda, 76 Nagle argued
that for a court actually to do so would be illegitimate. His
example was chosen to give the generally liberal supporters
of dynamic interpretation pause. American 'Jrucking takes
this question out of the law reviews and into the courtroom.
The industry petitioners and their amici argue that the
CAA as of 1970 incorporated cost-benefit analysis. Like
many, I find this argument hard to take seriously. 77 The language and history of the Act are consistent with the tenor of
the times: clean air at any cost; human health has no price
tag. To be sure, the intervening 30 years have seen a marked
shift in environmental policy (though not the fundamental
transformation that exponents of cost-benefit analysis
would like; witness the failure of recent regulatory reform
efforts). The pure health-based approach seems anachronistic. But, of course, Congress has never amended CAA § 109
to reflect this shift.
Now, believers in dynamic interpretation might contend that CAA § 109 should be read consistently with currently prevailing regulatory principles. But to say that CAA
§ 109 is a naive anachronism is one thing; to say that therefore it should be updated by the courts, rather than amended
by Congress, is a rather bold legisprudential step. Doing so
would be a much greater step away from statutory formalism than is the "effective ratification" approach of Brown &
Williamson. It would be a surprise to see the Court's conser-

find ample room to indulge their personal preferences for environmental purity.

Id. at 893.
75. John Nagle, Newt Gingrich: Dynamic Interpreter, 143 U . PA. L.
REv. 2209 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DYNAMIC
STATIJTORY IN'IBRPRETATION (1994)).
16. Id. at 2249.
77. This is not the place for a full exposition of the argument in favor of
the long-standing understanding of the Act One good statement of the
position is in the Federal Register preamble to the challenged rulemaking
itself. See U.S. EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38652, 38683-88 (July 18, 1997); see also
McGarity, supra note 60, at 22-28.
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vatives willing to indulge in such a dynamic reading. 78
Nonetheless, it is pretty amazing that they are being urged
to do so by none other than Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), not
usually known as a fierce advocate of judicial activism.
Here is an excerpt from Senator Hatch's amicus brief in

American Trucking:
The [CAA] must be construed in pari materia with
later-enacted regulatory reform statutes that direct agencies to favor cost-effective regulatory decisions and to
mitigate unwarranted regulatory burdens .where possible. See Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1870 n.17. The
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act ("UMRA") requires
EPA, like all agencies, to select the most cost-effective
regulatory alternative (or, alternatively, to explain why a
cost-effective option was not chosen). Pub. L. No. 104-4,
§205, 109 Stat. 64, 66 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 1535). The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act ("SBREFA") compels agencies to consider
and minimize the "significant economic impact" of regulations on "small entities." Pub. L. No. 104-121,
§241(b)(5), 110 Stat. 847, 864 (1996) (codified at 5
U.S.C. §604(a)(5)). EPA is correct that UMRA and
SBREFA do not override the mandates ofan agency's organic statute, see 2 U.S.C. §1535(b)(2); 5 U.S.C. §604
(a)(5), but, absent clear inconsistency, the Act should not
be interpreted to defeat Congress's clear directive in favor of cost-effective regulation. 79

This is a bolder request than the Court is likely to accept,
particularly since the milder forms of dynamism (ratifica-

78. Interestingly, on the merits Justice Breyer would clearly be in the
conservative camp on this issue. That is, he deems pure health-• d
standard setting, without regard to costs, as silly policy. His book,
Brealdng the Vicious Circle, is an attack on excessive, noncost-justified
efforts to eliminate tiny risks. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING lliE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993). Thus,
American Trucking will present a stark choice for Breyer between the
interpretive methodology he adopted in his Brown & Williamson dissent
and the regulatory methodology he has argued for in his nonjudicial
writings. Were he to read CAA § 109 to mandate EPA compliance with the
themes of Breaking the Vicious Circle, it is a safe bet that fellow Justices
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tion and the reenactment doctrine) cut the other way in this
case. Even were the Court to be tempted, it is a hard argument to make here given the failure of across-the-board regulatory reform proposals. 80 Of course, the Court might still
rule against EPA, pretending that the statute had always allowed or required EPA to take costs into account, but doing
so really would be pretending.

V. Conclusion
It is not always easy to tell what cases will continue to loom
large through the years. Chevron itself is a reminder.
Though it came to be the dominant case of administrative
law and continues to outdistance all others for the
"most-cited" prize, when it was decided it went largely unnoticed. And many decisions seemed momentous at the
time and then sunk beneath the waves. But Brown & Williamson likely will have important repercussions in many
areas, not least of them environmental law. Its specific and
immediate application to the American Trucking Ass 'n case
suggests that the Court will reverse the D.C. Circuit's
nondelegation ruling and uphold its long-standing interpretation of the CAA as precluding consideration of costs in
setting the NAAQS. The more general repercussions will be
salutary-a tum away from a too-strong reading of Chevron's deference requirement, and toward a broader, contextual approach in statutory interpretation.

who disagree will be quoting the Brown & Williamson dissent back at
him-particularly the line about a "legislative mood" not being a law.
79. Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Tom
Bliley in Support of Cross-Petitioners at 25, American Trucking Ass'n v.
Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (No. 99-1426).

80. See Jim Nichols, Revisionists Retreat: Republicans Back Of!Touted
Reform of Environmental Law in Light of Polls Showing Support for
Protection of Resources, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 22, 1995,
at Bl.

